🚨 Iranian State Threats

• The Minister for Security, Dan Jarvis, addressed the growing threat to the UK from Iran, detailing the government’s response and preventive measures.

• The Iranian regime is increasingly assertive, targeting dissidents, media organizations, and Jewish and Israeli communities in the UK. Since 2022, 20 Iran-backed plots posing lethal threats to UK citizens and residents have been thwarted.

• The government acknowledges the tireless efforts of UK’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies in preventing these threats.

• Iran uses criminal proxies to carry out activities within the UK, as seen in a 2023 conviction related to surveillance on Iran International’s UK headquarters.

• The National Cyber Security Centre has noted malicious cyber activities from actors linked to the Iranian state, targeting various sectors in the UK.

• The government announced placing Iran, including its intelligence services, IRGC, and MOIS, on the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS). This requires related activities in the UK to be registered or face severe penalties.

• A review by Jonathan Hall KC will assess the applicability of counter-terrorism laws to state threats like those posed by Iran, considering potential adjustments in proscription mechanisms.

• The UK will work with international allies, including Five Eyes and European partners, to counter Iranian threats and support democratic values.

• The National Security Act 2023 enhances police powers to combat state threats, criminalizing assistance to foreign intelligence services like IRGC and MOIS, potentially leading to 14-year prison sentences.

• Counter-terrorism policing now offers state threats training to all UK territorial police forces, enhancing frontline officer capability.

• The government is exploring further sanctions against Iranian-linked criminals and strengthening enforcement of immigration rules to counter Iranian infiltration.

• The Charity Commission will investigate potential Iranian-linked interference in the UK through certain organizations.

• Protective security measures will continue for those threatened by Iran, including Persian-language media and Jewish communities.

• The shadow Home Secretary expressed concern over Iran’s support for terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and its role in supplying Russia’s military technology.

• There were questions regarding the sufficiency of merely requiring registration under FIRS, with calls for stronger actions like proscription of the IRGC.

• The government faced questions about measures to protect potential victims of Iranian activity, including journalists, and whether more could be done regarding diplomatic expulsions and visa sanctions.

• Additional concerns were raised about the security of the Jewish community, effective police training, and banking restrictions affecting British-Iranians.

• The government is emphasizing the need for a comprehensive, international approach to tackle the threats from Iran, alongside continuous internal reviews and adjustments in legislation.

The session shows a moderate level of disagreement, warranting a rating of 3. This assessment is based on the following observations:

1. General Consensus on the Threat: There is an overarching agreement among the speakers on the seriousness of the Iranian threat to the UK. Both the Minister for Security, Dan Jarvis, and the shadow Home Secretary, Chris Philp, explicitly acknowledge Iran as a hostile state and the necessity to take action against it. This consensus is also echoed by members from different parties, showing broad agreement on the core issue.

2. Disagreement on Specific Actions: Despite the broad agreement on the severity of the threat, there is clear disagreement over the specific measures to be taken. Chris Philp questioned whether merely requiring registration under the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) is sufficient, suggesting more robust actions like outright proscription of the IRGC, which the UK’s allies have already done. He references the Home Secretary’s past statements in opposition to support his point:
   • Example: ‘The Minister said they do not comment on proscription, but the Home Secretary did comment on it in January 2023, when in opposition, and in unequivocal terms: “The IRGC is behaving like a terror organisation and must be prescribed as such.”’
3. Confusion and Delay in Policy Execution: The shadow Home Secretary also highlighted confusion and delays in the government’s policy. He questioned the timing and necessity of the review ordered by Jonathan Hall, contrasting it with earlier statements from the Home Secretary:
   • Example: ‘Why has it taken seven months to initiate a review, which the now Home Secretary talked about nearly a year ago?’
4. Back-and-Forth on Additional Measures: There was a notable back-and-forth on whether additional measures should be taken, such as expelling diplomats, using more sanctions, and enhancing protective security. These exchanges illustrate a divergence in views on the adequacy of current responses:
   • Example: ‘Are there more diplomats that we could expel who might be undertaking espionage activities or directing some of the activity on British soil?’
5. Questioning of the Government’s Approach: Some speakers directly questioned the government’s approach and urged for more decisive action, indicating a level of dissatisfaction or disagreement with the pace and nature of current strategies:
   • Example: ‘I hope that a decision on the IRGC will come sooner rather than later. I would like to hear how we will strengthen sanction regimes to start tackling the influence of Iran.’

Overall, while there is unity on the recognition of the threat from Iran, disagreements arise significantly in the discussion of specific policies, the timeliness of actions, and the level of response required, leading to a rating of 3.